Emerging Challenges

China stakes claim to new artificial island in the South China Sea

While international attention has focused elsewhere, China has quietly built a large new artificial island in the Paracel Islands, raising fresh questions about enforcement of maritime rules.

Crescent Group in the Paracel Islands, photographed from the air in 2007. [Swaminathan/Wikimedia Commons/CC BY 2.0]
Crescent Group in the Paracel Islands, photographed from the air in 2007. [Swaminathan/Wikimedia Commons/CC BY 2.0]

Global Watch |

In a move that has largely escaped broad international notice, China has seized the initiative at Antelope Reef, an obscure feature in the Paracel Islands roughly 400 kilometers off Vietnam's coast and part of the wider maritime corridor where Chinese pressure has increasingly tested open sea lanes and regional deterrence.

Since October 2025, more than 22 cutter-suction dredgers have worked at breakneck speed to create nearly 1,490 acres of new land, according to satellite analysis from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

If the pace continues, the site could rival or surpass Mischief Reef as China's largest artificial island in the South China Sea.

The project, involving subsidiaries of the U.S.-sanctioned China Communications Construction Company, included systematic deactivation of automatic identification system transponders en route from the Zhujiang River Estuary, in apparent violation of international maritime safety conventions.

Multinational naval vessels participate in Exercise Balikatan 2026 in the South China Sea. [U.S. Marine Corps]
Multinational naval vessels participate in Exercise Balikatan 2026 in the South China Sea. [U.S. Marine Corps]

Infrastructure now includes berths for roll-on/roll-off vessels, a helipad, a concrete plant and more than 50 structures.

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) analysts said the site's lagoon could support "more coastguard along with large numbers of maritime militia," a capability that would allow Chinese vessels to remain in contested waters longer and in greater numbers.

Vietnam, which claims the reef alongside China and Taiwan, issued its first formal protest only in March 2026, more than five months after dredging began.

"Vietnam resolutely opposes such activities," Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Pham Thu Hang said, adding that any foreign activity at Hoang Sa, Vietnam's name for the Paracels, without Hanoi's consent is "completely illegal and invalid."

Beijing has dismissed those objections.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian said the Paracels, known in China as Xisha, are China's "inherent territory," and described the construction as necessary work to improve living and working conditions and grow the local economy.

A familiar playbook

This follows a pattern Beijing has refined before.

China has controlled the Paracels since seizing them from Vietnam in 1974. But the scale and speed at Antelope Reef echo its 2013-15 artificial island construction in the Spratlys, where seven new features were created despite widespread environmental damage and protests from neighbors.

Open Source Centre analysts in the United Kingdom described the work as the latest stage in China's effort to solidify its "Great Wall of Sand," noting that the region already hosts a network of airfields, deep-water ports and anti-access capabilities.

The immediate military logic is still debated, but the operational value is clear.

Antelope Reef sits about 300 kilometers from Sanya, a major Chinese naval and air hub on Hainan, and about 400 kilometers from Da Nang. If built out like China's larger Spratly bases, it could extend Beijing's surveillance reach, improve logistics for its coast guard and maritime militia, and add redundancy for naval and air operations in the northern South China Sea.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), reclamation cannot transform a submerged reef, low-tide elevation or uninhabitable rock into a full legal island.

Artificial islands "do not possess the status of islands" and have no territorial sea of their own under UNCLOS.

Reclamation does not change that legal status.

The 2016 arbitral tribunal in the Philippines-China case made that principle clear when it rejected many of Beijing's maritime claims and ruled that legal entitlements must be assessed according to a feature's natural condition, not its later modification.

Maritime law experts say the implications are significant.

Lowell Bautista, a law of the sea expert at Western Sydney University, wrote in analysis carried by CNA and the Lowy Institute, that Antelope Reef shows "the growing gap between legal rules and material reality."

A new Chinese outpost there "won't create legal rights but will shape control over disputed waters," he argued.

Rules under strain

As the 10th anniversary of the 2016 South China Sea arbitration approaches, the stakes for the rules-based international order are rising.

China dismissed that ruling as ineffective and halted major new island-building for a time. The rapid work at Antelope Reef now tests whether the international community will allow similar unilateral changes to maritime geography to become normalized.

Vietnam's own limited reclamation activities in the Spratlys complicate its position somewhat.

Recent analysis from the Australian Naval Institute noted that Hanoi's island-building is also changing the operating environment, even as China's Antelope Reef expansion has widened Beijing's lead in artificial land and reef destruction.

Even so, the asymmetry matters.

Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) scholars have noted that South China Sea claimants pursue different strategies depending on capacity, political will and risk tolerance, while China's assertive actions have not diminished since the 2016 award.

That makes a narrowly focused case centered on environmental harm and interference with Vietnam's maritime rights a more plausible path than a broad sovereignty confrontation.

Coordinated responses are available and overdue.

Greater transparency through shared satellite monitoring, targeted economic pressure on the Chinese entities driving the project and diplomatic support for a carefully scoped arbitration offer practical steps.

Those measures would not require escalation, but they would raise the cost of changing facts at sea while preserving the legal baseline set by UNCLOS.

Europe also has a clear interest in upholding these norms. Its economies depend heavily on stable Indo-Pacific sea lanes for trade and supply chains, and the precedent matters well beyond Southeast Asia.

Left unchecked, incremental advances like Antelope Reef risk emboldening Beijing to make similar moves in the South China Sea and beyond, particularly as allied access, surveillance and logistics networks become more central to deterring coercion.

The time for a coordinated response is now, before the concrete sets and another precedent hardens in contested waters.

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