NATO’s Ankara summit puts Turkey back at the center

Global Watch | 2026-07-07

NATO's July summit in Ankara is not only about defense spending, Ukraine or Russia. It also shows that Turkey has become one of NATO's most important and complicated strategic players.

Ankara is often treated as difficult: useful but unpredictable, inside the alliance but willing to act on its own terms. That view is not wrong. It is incomplete.

Turkey sits at the meeting point of several issues shaping Euro-Atlantic security: the war in Ukraine, Black Sea access, Middle East instability, energy routes and Europe's push for stronger defense production.

That gives Ankara leverage. It also gives NATO a reason to manage disputes with Turkey carefully.

The summit will not erase tensions over Russia or disputes with European partners. But the strategic picture has changed. NATO does not need Turkey to be easy. It needs Turkey to be aligned enough on the issues that matter most.

Ankara gains leverage

Turkey's first source of influence is geography.

Through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, Ankara controls the maritime gateway between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Under the Montreux Convention, Turkey has authority over warship passage through those straits, giving it influence during conflict.

After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Turkey used that role to limit warship access to the Black Sea. It has kept relations with both Kyiv and Moscow, but it showed how one Turkish decision can shape the military environment around Ukraine.

The Black Sea is no longer a peripheral theater. It is a route for grain, energy, drones, naval pressure, port strikes and Russian power projection. It links Ukraine's survival to the security of Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and the wider eastern Mediterranean.

Turkey's defense industry adds to that shift.

Once heavily dependent on foreign suppliers, Turkey has built a larger domestic defense base. Its drones, armored vehicles, naval platforms and air defense components are now part of the wider defense market as European states try to buy faster and diversify suppliers.

That does not mean Turkey will replace major U.S. or European defense firms. It means Ankara is no longer only a buyer inside the alliance. It is increasingly a producer, especially in a conflict environment where drone warfare has reshaped regional security.

NATO needs balance

Turkey's second source of influence is diplomatic.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has maintained channels with both Ukraine and Russia while also supporting Ukraine's sovereignty and defense ties. Ankara hosted earlier talks during the war and has again offered to help revive negotiations.

That position frustrates some allies, especially when Turkey avoids a harder break with Moscow. But it also gives Ankara access that many NATO capitals do not have.

That access should not be overstated. Turkey cannot force a settlement, and mediation works only when both sides see advantage in it. Still, Ankara gives NATO a useful channel in a conflict where communication has narrowed.

The same applies beyond Ukraine. Turkey's position between Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus gives it a wider regional lens than many allies.

That makes Turkey difficult to fit into a narrow NATO script. It also makes it difficult to ignore.

The alliance's task is practical cooperation where interests overlap: Black Sea security, defense production, drone technology, maritime surveillance, counterterrorism, energy routes and support for Ukraine.

Turkey will continue to pursue strategic autonomy. So will several other allies, in different ways.

The question is whether NATO can turn that reality into a workable division of labor rather than a source of constant suspicion.

A stronger Turkey inside NATO is more useful than a frustrated Turkey drifting further from allied planning.

Turkey is not just hosting the summit. It is showing why NATO's southern and Black Sea dimensions can no longer be treated as secondary.

The alliance's future will still depend heavily on deterrence in eastern Europe. But it will also depend on ports, straits, drones, energy corridors and regional diplomacy.

On those questions, Ankara is not on the edge of the map. It is near the center.