A new scramble for the Sahel: coups, extremism, and the fight for minerals

By Olha Hembik | 2026-06-26

The Sahel is an African belt of nations where state borders exist clearly on paper but mean little on the ground, as poverty, instability, sectarian conflict, and entrenched violence dominate the landscape.

Since Western nations in recent years have scaled back their presence, lawlessness and bloodshed have intensified as new global players launch a scramble for power and resources.

Long-term strategic planning remains non-existent in the Sahel, yet the region’s vast mineral wealth ensures it remains a prize for foreign powers looking to expand their footprint.

No longer Françafrique

The term Sahel typically refers to five African nations: Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad.

As one of the world's poorest and predominantly Muslim regions, the Sahel features vast territories effectively controlled by al-Qaeda affiliates and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

These nations share more than just a colonial past; they face a modern crisis of statehood fueled by military coups, jihadist groups, foreign meddling, and a broken security architecture.

Although these nations gained independence from France in the 1960s, they remained firmly within Paris's orbit for decades.

This relationship gave rise to the term Françafrique, originally meant to highlight the mutual benefits of post-colonial ties, but soon transformed into a pejorative symbol of French neocolonialism.

Between 2022 and 2023, local pressures squeezed France out of the region, forcing Paris to end its military presence in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

By 2025, the trend reached Chad, where France officially closed its remaining military bases.

The French departure carried a distinct note of resentment.

Legalized violence

Internal crises sparked a wave of coups across the Sahel. Between 2020 and 2023, military factions seized power twice in Mali and once each in Burkina Faso and Niger. In Chad, the presidency passed to the late leader's son after frontline clashes claimed the father's life.

Coups across the core states hardest hit by Islamic extremism brought military regimes to power. This political shift triggered the withdrawal of one of the UN's largest peacekeeping missions, along with more than a thousand American troops.

The entrenchment of military juntas across these former French colonies fundamentally upended the region's security architecture. Then, on January 28, 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger announced their immediate withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Their primary motivation for leaving the bloc was the sanctions imposed on the ruling juntas.

In the wake of these departures, jihadist violence in the region surged. By 2024, the Sahel accounted for 51% of all terrorism-related deaths globally.

Last year, the region also led among the ten countries most affected by terrorism.

At the inaugural summit of the new Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which the junta leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger originally conceived as a mutual defense pact, talks focused on ending the operations of occupying forces in the region.

"No nation or interest group will dictate terms to our countries anymore," General Omar (Abdourahamane) Tchiani, head of Niger’s military government, said at the time.

Hunting for resources

Rather than a European-aligned policy, the Alliance of Sahel States chose alignment with Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Even before this, the new cooperation model with Moscow involved private military companies (PMC) providing armed protection to the ruling regime in exchange for developing mineral deposits.

In Africa, Russia was interested in countries with deposits of oil, gold, diamonds, uranium, and manganese.

The Wagner PMC has operated in Africa since 2017. During its active phase, the military company maintained between 15,000 and 25,000 armed personnel.

Meanwhile, the PMC structures received state funding from the Russian Federation. Following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the functions of the mercenary group passed to the "Africa Corps" under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Thousands of former Wagner fighters remained in Central Africa, continuing to subject the local population to terror, murder, and torture.

According to Lindsay Freeman, director of technology, law and policy at the Human Rights Center, University of California Berkeley School of Law, Africa Corps is considered an organ of the Russian state under international law. Consequently, war crimes committed by the group can be attributed to the Russian government under the rules of state responsibility.

Yuriy Oliynyk, co-founder of the Center for African Studies, argues that Russia used propaganda to influence African leaders, presenting itself as an alternative to the West and leveraging anti-colonial talking points for cooperation. Yet, it failed to establish exclusive dominance.

"Even the regimes most sympathetic to Russia show a kind of multi-vector policy. Russia cannot crowd out other players from these economic markets, let alone replace Western nations economically," Oliynyk said.

He notes China, Turkey, and Iran among the new actors in the Sahel market. China's strategy in the Sahel relies chiefly on massive investments in infrastructure, manufacturing, and resource extraction.

At the same time, Turkey relies primarily on trade, infrastructure development, and arms exports. This includes Bayraktar drones and military training.

Iran's interests in the Sahel include an anti-Western political alliance and the opportunity to circumvent sanctions.

The export of instability

On April 25–26, 2026, Al-Qaeda-linked militant groups and Tuareg separatists launched their largest joint offensive in Mali.

During the attack, the country's defense minister was killed, and the Africa Corps had to pull its forces out of a key territory. Videos of the humiliating Russian retreat caused serious damage to Moscow's reputation and its ambitions in Africa.

Experts predict that the security crisis in the western Sahel region has entered a dangerous new phase.

Despite a legitimate desire for sovereignty in the Sahel, the military regimes are in no hurry to return to civilian rule and hold elections, as they fear losing power.

Inter-ethnic conflicts continue to fuel instability in the region, and the fight against jihadist groups is yielding no noticeable results.

Extremist organizations, including Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), are escalating violence in the region. These same groups are expanding instability throughout the African continent.

High birth rates, unemployment, and widespread poverty further worsen the situation. Young people in the Sahel have dim prospects, confined to emigration, participation in armed factions, or involvement in crime.

Analysts warn that if radical Islamist organizations unite, they could establish an ISIS-like entity within the Sahel that extends well past national borders.

Deprived of long-term international backing, the region is slowly becoming a hub of instability. Projections suggest this could destabilize the more resilient states of the Gulf of Guinea.

Neighboring nations -- including Ivory Coast, Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, and Cameroon -- already confront Sahel-based extremist groups on their northern borders