Ukraine war strains Russian military staying power

Global Watch | 2026-06-20

Ukraine's drones expose Russia's limits

Russia still has mass, missiles and nuclear weapons. But Ukraine's expanding drone campaign is showing that Moscow's power is less insulated than it once appeared.

As G7 leaders meet in Evian-les-Bains with Ukraine on the agenda, the condition of Russian forces is becoming part of the diplomatic calculation. More than four years of war have imposed heavy costs on Russian manpower, equipment, fuel infrastructure and operational tempo.

The question for Ukraine's partners is no longer only how much pressure Russia can apply. It is how much pressure Russia can absorb.

Ukraine has turned a war Moscow expected to dominate into an attrition contest that now reaches deep inside Russian territory. Strikes on refineries, military airfields and logistics infrastructure have exposed gaps in Russia's air defenses and forced Moscow to defend a vast rear area while still fighting at the front.

Attrition exposes Russia

Russian casualties have reached levels far above early expectations.

CSIS estimated earlier this year that Russian forces had suffered about 1.2 million battlefield casualties, including killed, wounded and missing, between February 2022 and December 2025. Those figures are difficult to verify independently, but the scale of attrition is no longer in serious dispute.

The losses matter because they affect what Russia can do next.

Moscow can still recruit, pay bonuses and rotate forces. But much of that manpower is used to replace losses rather than create decisive new capacity. That helps explain why Russian advances have remained costly and limited despite heavy firepower.

Reuters reported in February that Russia occupied about 20% of Ukraine but had gained only about 1.3% more territory since early 2023. The front is not static, but movement has become expensive.

Analysts have also pointed to problems in Russian battlefield performance. Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute wrote that Russian combat performance was "waning," even as drone strikes, shelling and glide bombs remained intense.

That distinction matters.

Russia remains dangerous. But danger is not the same as strength. A force can still inflict damage while losing efficiency, burning through equipment and relying on costly methods to move the line.

Equipment losses reinforce the point.

High rates of armored vehicle, artillery and air defense losses have forced greater reliance on refurbished Soviet-era systems, imported components and outside suppliers. Iranian drones and North Korean artillery have helped Russia sustain the war, but that reliance also shows that Moscow's own industrial base is under strain.

Ukraine's drone campaign has made that strain more visible.

In June, a Ukrainian drone strike hit Gazprom Neft's Moscow refinery, the largest fuel supplier to the Moscow region. Reuters reported that industry sources said the attack halted operations and damaged a primary refining unit responsible for more than half the plant's capacity.

The strike did not just hit an industrial site. It showed that even the capital region's energy infrastructure is within reach.

Drone pressure widens

The refinery campaign has become one of Ukraine's clearest ways to impose costs on Russia away from the front.

Reuters has reported that Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries have doubled since the start of 2026, causing full or partial shutdowns and reducing output of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel. In May, sources told Reuters that refineries accounting for roughly a quarter of Russia's total refining capacity had fully or partly halted operations.

The domestic effects are becoming harder for Moscow to hide.

Tatneft, one of Russia's largest oil producers, imposed restrictions on fuel sales at its stations across the country after attacks on refinery infrastructure. Reuters also reported fuel shortages and long queues in Russian-controlled Crimea, Krasnodar and Donetsk.

That does not mean Russia's economy is collapsing. But it does show vulnerability in a sector central to Moscow's budget, military logistics and public confidence.

The same pattern has appeared in the air war.

Ukraine's 2025 drone strike on Russian air bases targeted strategic bombers and airborne early warning aircraft far from the front. Reuters could not verify all Ukrainian claims, but satellite imagery showed several bombers destroyed or badly damaged at one base.

For a nuclear power that presents itself as secure across eleven time zones, that was a significant exposure.

Russia's nuclear arsenal remains large and credible. But the war has shown that the infrastructure around Russian military power is not untouchable. Air bases, refineries, depots and transport links can be reached by a country fighting from a position of material disadvantage.

That changes the G7 context.

European leaders are trying to persuade Washington that Ukraine's position has improved and that additional support could strengthen Kyiv's hand in any negotiations. Reuters reported that one European diplomat said there was now a "joint analysis" that Russia is on the defensive.

That does not mean Ukraine can win quickly. It still faces manpower shortages, air defense gaps and repeated Russian attacks on cities and infrastructure.

But it does mean Russia's image of inexhaustible power has been damaged.

The war has not eliminated Moscow's military options. It has made them more costly, more exposed and more dependent on systems Ukraine has learned to target.

For the G7, that is the strategic lesson.

Sustained support does not need to defeat Russia in a single blow. It needs to keep raising the price of aggression until Moscow's options narrow.

Ukraine's drones have already shown the path.

They have carried the war into the rear areas Russia once counted on as safe.