Crisis Watch

Sudan's collapse fuels great-power competition

As war devastates Sudan and deepens regional instability, Russia and China are positioning to turn state collapse into strategic advantage.

People walk along a street near al-Tijani al-Mahi Hospital (unseen), which specializes in the diagnosis and treatment of mental and neurological disorders, in Omdurman on April 19, 2026. [Khaled Desouki/AFP]
People walk along a street near al-Tijani al-Mahi Hospital (unseen), which specializes in the diagnosis and treatment of mental and neurological disorders, in Omdurman on April 19, 2026. [Khaled Desouki/AFP]

Global Watch |

Sudan's war has shattered the country and is steadily redrawing the strategic map around it.

The humanitarian toll is immense. The United Nations estimates that 33.7 million people, nearly two-thirds of Sudan's population, will need aid in 2026. More than 13.6 million have been displaced, either within Sudan or across its borders.

The country's health system has largely collapsed. Cholera is spreading. Severe malnutrition is rising. Basic services have broken down across broad swaths of the country.

But Sudan's collapse is not only a humanitarian disaster. It is becoming a geopolitical opening.

Sudanese people make their way past damaged buildings in Khartoum on April 16, 2026. [Khaled Desouki/AFP]
Sudanese people make their way past damaged buildings in Khartoum on April 16, 2026. [Khaled Desouki/AFP]

As infrastructure crumbles and state authority weakens, outside powers are gaining room to maneuver.

Russia and China, in particular, see opportunity in the vacuum created by war, as Iran exploits the chaos of Sudan's civil war for strategic Red Sea access.

Sudan's strategic value has not diminished amid the fighting. Its location, resources and regional links make it more consequential.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has pointed to a wider pattern across the continent: most of Africa's major armed conflicts are concentrated in authoritarian-leaning states, where weak governance and violence reinforce each other. Sudan is now one of the clearest examples.

Regional fallout

International concern has been high, but effective intervention has remained limited. Aid deliveries are still blocked by fighting, insecurity and restrictions on access. The crisis is therefore expanding faster than relief can reach it.

More than 20 million people now require health assistance. Another 21 million face acute food insecurity, according to UN agencies. Children account for roughly half of those expected to need help, while severe acute malnutrition continues to climb.

Even returns to areas of origin remain fragile.

Families are often going back to places where infrastructure is damaged, services are scarce and insecurity persists. In practice, return often means exposure to new risks rather than a path to recovery.

That instability is creating opportunities for outside actors willing to exchange support for leverage, access and long-term influence.

Power fills vacuums

Russia has kept lines open to both sides in the conflict while positioning itself as a possible mediator or security partner if a ceasefire takes hold, still clinging to its Red Sea naval base deal in war-torn Sudan.

That gives Moscow flexibility. It can remain relevant during the war and convert that relevance into future military, political or economic deals.

China's approach is quieter, but no less strategic. Beijing already holds economic stakes in Sudan through earlier infrastructure investments and is well placed to pursue reconstruction contracts if the fighting eases.

Crucially, China tends to engage without attaching political conditions related to governance or reform. In a shattered state facing immense recovery needs, that model can be attractive.

Sudan's geography raises the stakes further. The country sits at the intersection of the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and North Africa. That gives it outsized importance for migration routes, trade corridors and Red Sea security.

If Sudan's collapse drags on, the fallout will not stop at its borders. It will add pressure to neighboring states already grappling with insurgencies, border tensions and resource disputes.

The strategic contest is already taking shape. Russia is likely to pursue security ties, political influence and access to resources.

China is more likely to focus on ports, trade routes and long-term economic positioning.

Western powers, by contrast, have centered their response on humanitarian relief and ceasefire diplomacy, but they are competing with actors more willing to move without political demands.

Sudan's crisis does not sever its ties to the West. It does, however, raise the cost of Western engagement and increase the appeal of partners offering immediate assistance with fewer conditions.

That is why the stakes extend far beyond Sudan itself. The country's mineral wealth, agricultural potential and strategic location ensure that whatever emerges after the war will matter across the region.

If post-conflict Sudan is shaped on purely transactional terms, outside powers may lock in long-term influence while deepening the same fragilities that helped drive the war.

For now, the clearest path remains sustained humanitarian relief backed by focused diplomacy, before Sudan's collapse hardens into a broader strategic setback.

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